The purpose of this paper is to econometrically test the hybrid Post Keynesian-Neo Schumpeterian (evolutionist) theory of investment demand developed in Goldstein (1992a, 1992b) . In Goldstein (1992a, 1992b) , a Post Keynesian-Neo Schumpeterian (PK-NS) theory of enterprise investment demand and an associated rate of accumulation are developed in which the optimal investment decision depends on expected profitability, the intensity of competition and the character of the competitive regime,' the degree of financial fragility, and managerial attitudes toward the growth-financial safety tradeoff inherent in the investment decision. In this paper, empirical support is obtained from regression analysis of the determinants of the rate of accumulation in U.S. manufacturing between 1954 and 1988. The econometric results strongly support our theory of investment demand.
The paper is divided into three sections. Section I summarizes our theory of investment demand. Section II specifies and conducts econometric tests of the theory. Section III contains our concluding remarks.
A Post Keynesian-Neo Schumneterian Theorv of Investment Demand
In Goldstein (1992a, 1992b) , we develop a PK-NS investment theory that: (1) considers external finance and thus the management-finance relation: (2) includes the separation between ownership and control of the firm and thus the management-stockholder relation; (3) incorporates the influence of Keynesian uncertainty, financial fragility, and Keynes-Minsky instability on accumulation; (4) brings to the forefront of investment theory the character and 2 intensity of competition: strategic shifts in investment policy are triggered by shifts in the competitive regime: (5) provides a careful specification and a rational microfoundation for a positive lfinvestor-die" relation between competition and investment; and (6) is formalized as an enterprise optimization problem.
In Goldstein (1992a, 1992b ) the complete model is developed sequentially. The first paper abstracts from both the Schumpeterian competition effect and the distinction between offensive investment and defensive (innovative cost-cutting) investment and focuses on the Post Keynesian aspects of the investment decision. It places the firm within a stable corespective competitive enivronment.
The second paper adds the concepts of a rupture in the competitive status-quo --a shift from oligopolistic, coresnective relations to anarchic, uncontrolled competition --and adds different modes of accumulation to the model. We follow the same sequential development in this overview.
The first model has four core assumptions. First, the firm operates in an environment of true, Knightian or Keynesian uncertainty. That is, the future is unknowable in nrincirsle; it cannot be adequately represented by a set of stable subjective probability distributions that agents believe with certainty to be "the truth@t.2 Second, physical capital is illiguid and the accumulation process is substantially irreversible. Third, managers and owners are distinct economic agents with an unresolved principal-agent conflict; under normal circumstances the firm is controlled by management.
Fourth, management seeks the long-term growth and financial safety of the firm itself (and, through these, its own security and status) and guards its decision-making authority against encroachment by stockholders and creditors. Dividends, like interest payments, are a cost of managerial autonomy --a constraint --rather than an objective to be maximized.
At the most abstract level, the investment decision-making problem confronting management is this. The financing of investment, whether internal or external, generates implicit or explicit cash flow commitments to finance capitalists. Under the assumptions of illiguid capital (capital in place cannot be resold at prices high enough to payoff debts or required dividends) and true uncertainty, management can never be sure that investment projects will produce sufficient gross profits to cover the cash commitments generated by their financing. Yet failure to meet these commitments may result in a crisis of managerial autonomy or even in bankruptcy. Thus, capital accumulation is a contradictory process. Investment is inherentlv risky, while the failure to invest will ultimately lead to the firm's marsinalization or demise. The firm's drive for growth and profits stressed in Post Keynesian theory, then, is constrained by management's desire for financial security for the firm and decisionmaking autonomy for itself. In our model, the investment decision creates an unavoidable arowth-safetv tradeoff.
In our (1992a) paper we show that the dynamic capital accumulation problem can be reduced to a sequence of one-period-at-a-time investment decisions, the first step of which can be described as follows. Management tries to maximize a preference function O(G(I), S(1)) where G reflects the firm's growth objectives and S embodies management's concern with both financial safety and decision-making autonomy. G is a function of two subgoals: expected net profits (revenues minus operating costs) net of the dividends and interest payments (or costs of autonomy) associated with each prospective level of investment: and the capital stock in the coming period --an index of the status and size of the firm.
The S function also has two arguments. The first is an index of the likelihood of an autonomy crisis in the short run. Specifically, it is the perceived likelihood, based on management's best estimate of the probability of various demand and cost conditions in the coming period, that expected gross profit flows will fail to cover interest and dividend commitments next period. The second is an index of the firm's perceived vulnerability to an autonomy crisis in the lonaer run0 in which concrete forecasts of cost and revenues are virtually meaningless. It is defined as the difference between the current level of debt and the maximum debt level that management considers to be safe. This 11safe'1 debt level is thus a Keynesian or Minskian variable that varies with shifts in management's attitude toward and assessment of risk. To borrow Minsky's terms, these two arguments are indicators of management's perception of the extent to which the firm is either financially fragile or robust in the short and long run.
Thus, S(I) is the vehicle throuuh which the Kevnesian-Minskian ideas are incoroorated in the model. Finally, we consider the firm's relative preference for growth versus safety. Since 0, >O and 0, >O (where subscripts denote partial derivatives), the relative growth-safety preference, OJO,, depends on assumptions about O,, and O,,. In our first model we assume that O,, = 0 GS = 0 and OS, < 0: the growth imperative is independent of the size of the firm, while its attitude toward security and autonomy is variable. In particular, we assume that when S is low, or the firm is in a financially precarious position, management responds to the threat to its decision-making autonomy by placing more weight on financial security relative to growth and, therefore, is less willing to undertake inherently risky investment projects. Financial fraailitv constrains investment.
The optimal solution and comparative static properties model can best be understood by analyzing the G-S tradeoff. Comparative static properties and the mechanics of the model are most easily understood by considering changes in the intensity of the G-S tradeoff generated by a parameter change. Consider, for example, how an increase in the firm's profit markup will cause a rise in investment demand. A rise in the profit markup per unit output will Figure I : the optimal solution and the G-S tradeoff 6 have three distinct positive effects on investment demand. First, it will raise the marginal investment-induced increment to growth increasing marginal gross profits at every I level (shifting G, to the right). Second, it will reduce the marginal decline in S, will decline in absolute value as the rise in marginal gross bY up and safety.
profits lowers the likelihood that additional I will trigger a shortterm autonomy crisis by creating more marginal cash flow (shifting -(Os/OJS1 right). Third, it will raise the level of S through higher gross profits that lower the likelihood of a short-term autonomy crisis so that the preference weight on S, 0,, is reduced (shifting -(Os/OG)SI right). Thus, I unambiguously rises as a higher profit markup weakens the G-S tradeoff --less security need be sacrificed to gain more growth through capital accumulation.
Turning to the financial determinants of investment demand, increases in the initial stock of debt or initial debt-equity ratio and decreases in the prudent level of debt cause a reduction in I.
Both parameter changes intensify the G-S tradeoff by lowering S and thereby raising management's preference for safety relative to growth (Os/Oc rises). In addition, a decrease in the acceptable level of debt .causes the marginal security loss to rise; -S, increases, so I falls' further. These effects respectively demonstrate that the degree of leveraae and manaaement's historicallv snecific and institutionally continaent attitude toward lona term financial vulnerabilitv affect I
behavior. We also demonstrate that increases in uncertainty raise the intensity of the G-S tradeoff by reducing S and increasing marginal security losses. Thus, the model is infused with important Keynesian 7 insights concerning uncertainty, the importance of financial structures, and secularly and cyclically variable attitudes toward risk.
The micro model thus supports a theory of accumulation in which investment instability can be rooted in the real sector (through changes in the profit markup) or in the financial sector (through changes in the interest rate, the required dividend payout ratio, and the degree of financial fragility), or in both.
We now turn attention to the complex relation between competition and accumulation developed in the work of Schumpeter (see Oakley (1990; pp. 38, 208, and 215) and further elaborated by Nelson and Winter (1982) . Our interest in this topic was stimulated by numerous articles in the business press over the past decade describing how many U.S. industrial corporations reacted to the dramatic rise in foreign competition they experienced in the early to mid 1980s by radically altering their basic approach to investment policy, labor relations, cost and quality control, and so forth. That is, they initiated qualitative shifts in their comDetitive stratesies. Some aspects of these strategic shifts fit comfortably into standard theories of enterprise decision-making. Others --such as the unilateral imposition of alternative, hostile labor relations regimes and the undertaking of maior new debt-financed, labor-savina, costcuttinu investment Droiects in the face of collaosinc nrofit rates --did not. However, these investment projects, (which we label V1defensive11 investment), and the strategic change that fostered them, do fit comfortably with Schumpeterls discussion of the invest-or-dieaspects of competitive struggle (see Oakley (1990; pp. 38, 208, 215, a and 243). In Crotty and Goldstein (1992b) we extend the basic model to incorporate this key aspect of the role of competition in investment determination.
In our model, the firm makes projections of the determinants of profitability over the course of an intermediate investment planning
horizon, then attempts to maximize the function 0. However, if this strategy fails to keep the firm in a position to survive the potential competitive struggles that may take place bevond the planning horizon, it must be replaced. Suppose that the firm believes that it must maintain its market share above some critical limit below which it will not have the financial, technical, or marketing power to withstand possible future attacks by larger, more powerful competitors.
This critical market share then of 0 maximization.
Consider the case in which becomes a constraint on the strategy the firm had been operating for some time in a coresnective competitive environment, one that made it possible to O-maximize in a satisfactory way. Within this environment, output enhancing/cost-neutral (capital-widening) accumulation will be dominant, and competition and investment will be inversely related because more competition brings lower profits and a decline in safety.3 Suppose now that foreign competition increases qualitatively, rupturing the pre-existing oligopolistic, corespective relations among domestic firms, and initiating an anarchic competitive struggle that will lower profits and raise uncertainty.
That is, suppose there is a shift in the competitive regime.
More than likely, the firm's market share constraint will be violated and its long-term maximization strategy must 9 viability will be threatened. In the model we concentrate on foreign competition, define I0
ID as qffensive and defensive investment respectively, and specify When the competitive constraint is nonbinding, so that the firm is satisfied with both its performance and the structures and strategies that generate it, ID = 0: all I takes a capital widening form that reproduces these structures and strategies. In this situation, the G-S tradeoff is unimpinged and operates as the sole mechanism.
However, a decline in PF that violates the constraint will force a transition in investment policy to the riskier I D -dominant mode of accumulation. The firm is coerced bv comnetitive nressure stronq enouah to threaten its renroduction to invest in defensive costcuttina canital soods that must be debt financed because of the collanse of the nrofit rate. And because the shift in investment strategy has large costs of adjustment, the amount of defensive investment required to lower unit costs must be substantial.
After the transition to an I D -dominated strategy, the firm is faced with a choice between ID and zp in the maximization of 0 where @ is the stock of capital with the technology associated with I0 and z is the capacity utilization rate of this type of capital. In this situation, the competition effect captures only one of the two channels through which competition impinges on I: it is only a partial effect. The total impact of heightened competition on I is the sum of this positive neo-Schumpeterian effect and the negative effect on I0
caused by the decline in the profit rate and the increase in financial fragility. This total effect is, on a priori grounds, sign indeterminate. Nevertheless, the unique NS competition an important competition-profitability-fragility nexus.
effect creates With respect to econometric testing, the theory specifies: (1) expected profitability; (2) financial fragility/robustness: (3) the intensity of competition: (4) the costs of autonomy ; and (5) managerial attitudes toward leverage as the main determinants of investment demand. In the next section, we conduct econometric tests of the theory.
II. Econometric Specification and Tests
In this section we: (1) discuss the theoretical specification of an investment equation; (2) consider an appropriate statistical specification for a test of our I theory using time series data for the U.S. manufacturing sector; (3) discuss the data employed; and (4) report the results of our statistical estimation.
I1.A Theorectical Specification
In the last section we concluded that our theory of total investment demand can be summarized as
vhere R is expected net revenues --gross profits minus the costs of F autonomy, C = P -JJ is an index of international competitive pressure, and B is the level of financial robustness/fragility.
In Goldstein (1992a, 1992b) it is shown that our theory of I demand is derived from a theory of the desired (optimal) ' capital stock, K4.G Thus, our theory of the desired capital stock is summarized as
Considering the formal specification of our model, (11 R = cl-fl)II-rD where r is the nominal interest rate, D is the stock of debt, and B is the dividend payout rate, and (2) A specification of this type allows us to isolate periods of competition-coerced offensive investment.
In sumnary, the theoretical specification of our desired capital stock equation can be restated as
,An equation for net investment, INI can be derived from equation (2) and the definition for net investment:
;Ihere K-I is the actual capital stock in the previous period.
Substituting equation (2) Under these restrictions and abstracting from competitive regime zhifts, equation (5) can be rewritten as vhere 8, . . . P4 3re parameters, the t subscript denotes the time period, and E is a random disturbance term whose statistical specification is discussed in the next sub section.'
1I.B Statistical Specification
The statistical specification Of Et is now considered a .
It is assumed that Et 'L @J(o,~$, E+ is heteroscedastic, and E+ and Ed
_ ,
we autocorrelated for all t, and particular values of i, i # t, -which -dill be determined by statistical tests. It is assumed that oz is a 2 function of the size of the capital stock just prior to the current period's investment flow. In particular, it is assumed that 0: 9 4 = aK& for all t where a is a constant. Thus, correcting for heteroscedasticity requires that all variables in equation (6) tJhere V, = r:+.'KP , 4, -1 is a homoscedastic error term. Equation (7) not only corrects for the heteroscedasticity problem but also establishes an equation for the gross rate of accumulation (I';!K, L'~ ,as a function 4 4-of the net profit rate, the rate of competition, and the debt equity ratio (contained in D;/K,_j --an index of financial fragility. 10 a _ Eefore making the explanatory variables in equation (?) operational, we make some futher adjustments to the equation to be estimated. First, in order to perserve the nonlinear relationship between the rate of accumulation and the firm's financial security, we substitute (D'/Kt_li ' for (D')2!K, 4-1 in equation (7).
Second, we assume that all rates associated with the independent variables are based on Kt rather than Kt_l as the scale factor. Incorporating these modifications into equation (71, we can rewrite the rate of accumulation of gross investment equation as (8) .An equation for the net rate of accumulation is derived by subtracting 5 from the right side of equation (8).
We now construct the dependent and independent.variables from existing data sources. While the gross and net rates of accumulation, GRA and NRA, can readily be constructed from existing data, the expected net profit rate, ENPR, the rate of competition, and Dt!K, 1 a-need further elaboration. rlnder Keynesian uncertainty, we assume that the firm bases its projection of the future net profit rate on the past performance k of the net profit rate, NPR. An observation on the implications of the L' lag structure is in order. Increases in L will at first raise L-L' and reduce financial security because L' is slow to adjust. This will result in a decline in GRA and NRA in the current period. Given the nonlinear specification of the effect of (L-L41 on GRA, the gradual adjustment of L4 in subsequent period s will result initially in further declines in GRA and then in increases in GRA as L"' td.ScS. The extent of the recovery in GRA, once a new steady state is reached, depends on the extent of the adjustment in L.'. Mhile the extent of the recovery in GRA and thus the extent of the adjustment in Lf oan be tested econometrically by calculating the overall impact of (L-L') on GRA from the sum of estimated lag coefficients, the proposed time distribution of the effects of L-L' on GRA --negative effects in the early periods and positive effects in latter periods --cannot be easily tested.12 Finally, the length of the lag and thus the ;un)conservative nature of the adjustment process, based on the degree of perceived risk can be determined in our econometric specification.
Rewriting equation (8) in its operational form and by taking into account the possibilty of (unforseen) gestation lags and a constant term as a result of aggregation,13 we arrive at an equation for the gross rate of accumulation decision, GRAD:
Recognizing that GRA t is itself a distributed gestation lag on GRADt.
we can write Given that a gestation lag of length p on explanatory variables which consist of distributed lags of length q results in a distributed lag of length p + q, the estimating equation for GRA, equation (9), is a distributed lag of length p + k in NFR, of length p + m in IFR, and of length p + 1 in L and L2. Thus, equations (8) and ( Thus, we confine our analysis to the manufacturing sector.
We now consider the construction from existing data of the -variables contained in equation (10). 
III. Results
Regression results for the basic GRA and NRA equations based on quarterly data for 1954:2-1988:2 are reported in Table I . Results based on annual data for 1954-1988 are reported in Appendix B. The results in Table I and Appendix B provide strong empirical support for the PK-NS theory of accumulation developed in Section I.
In particular, the overall Schumpeterian competition effect, which isolates the firm's response to increased competitive pressures holding other factors, particularly the profit rate, constant, is large and significant. The manufacturing sector responds to increased competition by defending its existing capital through new investment, presumably qreared at cost reduction rather than output enhancement.
Based on the equations in Table I , a .Ol increase in IPR results respectively in a .0165 and .0139 increase in GRA and NRA.33
While the results reported here cannot provide conclusive support for the behavioral mechanisms outlined in our theory, they are not inconsistent with our theory and in combination with the other results they allow us to explain the stylized facts of the post-war period in a manner that supports our behavioral theory: firm's are coerced by competitive pressures to take on increased risks and higher levels of debt which were previously not optimal in the hope of surviving the competitive onslaught, thus increasing financial fragility in an already crisis prone environment.
In addition, the NPR has an important impact on GRA and NRA. A 
L2
are respectively the sum of the lag coefficients for L and Lz and aNRA/aL is defined analogously. The results in Table I reveal that aGRA/aL : 0 and BNFWaL 1 0 for L .f .311 and .321. This result is different from the typical Post Keynesian With respect to the length of the L and Lz lags and the overall effect (discussed above), the long lag length suggests that the adjustment of L* in response to an increase in L is verv slow and a negative overall L effect on GRA and NRA suggests that the adjustment is incomplete. Both these results are to be expected. A lag length of 7 years, depending on the length of the gestation lag, suggests between a 4 and 5.5 year adjustment period. In an historical period characterized by two large increases --from 1965 -1970 and in the 1980s --in L one would expect a conservative managerial attitude howards financial risk, particularly in the latter years when firms were compelled to reluctantly take on new debt due to increasing competitive pressures, Thus, L' is likely.to adjust slowly. Under the same circumstances, it is also expected that the adjustment in L' is only partial: ceteris paribus, increasing financial fragility has kept management consistently uncomfortable with its degree of leverage.
In general, the full lag structures, not reported here, take on the standard inverted U shape that is expected when expectational and gestational lags are combined. With the exception of the lag structure for L and L', discussed above, the lag distributions imply a gestation lag from 1.5-Z years and an expectational lag of 1.5-2 years in length. Both lags seem reasonable on a priori grounds.
Finally, an examination of the residuals associated with the six equations reported in Table I reveal that Table II .24 The appropriate F-tests reveal that the linear restrictions associated with the single regime equations (without slope and intercept dummies -- Table I ) are rejected at the 5% and 8% percent level of significance when compared respectively to the three regime and two regime models. 2s The results in Table II are consistent with our previous findings on the relationship between the net profit rate, the debt-equity ratio and the rate of accumulation. The addition of regime shifts confirm our hypothesis that three distinct periods exist. Our estimates reveal that in the period 1954:2-1969:2 that the competitive constraint on the manager's investment decision is not binding --despite the relatively large value for the sum of lag coefficients in this early period, the overall gpR cannot be statistically distinquished from a value of zero. If the period 1970:1-1988:2 is undividied, we find that the competitive constraint operates in this period and that for a one percent increase in the foreign share of the U.S. domestic market there is approximately a two percent increase in '6 the rate of accumulation.'-If we subdivide this period, we find that between 197O:l and 1979:4 and between 198O:l and 1988:2 the defensive investment effect is operable. The effect is stronger in the latter period with the import share elasticity of the rate of accumulation is 1.7 compared to 1.38 for GRA and 1.41 compared to 1.13 for NRA. These differences between middle and late periods are statistically significant. This division of the post-war experience with .
international competition into specific regimes is an important aid for understanding qualitative distinctions in the nature of the accumulation process.
IV. Conclusion
The main objective of this paper has been to summarize and, more importantly, empirically support a Post Keynesian-Neo Schumpeterian micro-founded theory of accumulation. It has been argued that the optimal investment decision depends on the level of expected profitability, the degree of competition, and the degree of financial In addition, the profit rate-competition-financial security nexus allows us to explain important trends in the post-war accumulation of capital. In particular, the tendency to a strong rate of-accumulation in the face of declining profit rates and increasing financial fragility is explained by this nexus. i950 1955 i950 1960 i950 196j' 1970 i950 1975 i950 1980 i950 1985 This type of competition therefore generates "true" or Keynesian or Knightian uncertainty within which the future is unknowable in principle. Neoclassical theory uses a subjective probability density function to capture the effect of "risk", but as has been stressed by Fost Keynesian writers, this approach is adequate only for successive outcomes produced by a knowable and unchanging generating mechanism.
However, the outcomes in economics are not so generated:
institutions, knowledge and agent preferences all change with each successive "draw".
Keynes rejected the the theory of investment firms and wealth-holders probability calculus and its implications for and portfolio selection. He insisted that could never obtain the information they needed to make rational decisions, yet had to make them nevertheless. 3Capital widening is typically defined as accumulation without significant technical change. It expands capacity without changing the capital-labor ratio. Capital deepening accumulation, on the other hand, does involve substantial technical change and a ris& in the capital-labor ratio. Capital-deepening investment is a weapon used by capital against labor; it allows firms to fire workers and increase the reserve army while maintaining their capacity to produce.
Here we use the terms more broadly. Capita1 widening refers to investment that takes place within and reproduces a stable corespective competitive regime. Such investment does not disrupt the existing state of capital-labor relations and does not destroy the ability of the competing firms to control the pace of technical change and manage the rate of obsolescence. Capital deepening investment threatens both the state of capital-labor relations and the corespective relations among firms. See Crotty 1990a for a discussion rJf these distinctions. 4This discussion abstracts from the important distinction between long term and short term strategies emphasized in Crotty 1991a.
'It should be noted that the thesis that a dynamic theory of competition is required to make sense of the simultaneous occurrence of a falling rate of profit, rising financial fragility, and a stronger than expected rate of accumulation is not original here.
Pollin (19861, for one, stated it quite clearly. What is original, we believe, is our demonstration that such behavior is consistent with a rational enterprise investment strategy. 6This equivalence requires that gestation lags are unforeseen and that all costs of adjustment with the exception of those associated with a change in the mode of accumulation are negligible.
-)The OCX J ! 0 assumption is necessitated by the mathematical structure of the model, particularly the behavior of U. It ensures that cuts in Iw are not the primary method by which firms reduce costs to meet the competition. Given that it is commonplace for actual firms to meet the competition through increases in cost-cutting investment, the 0~, ! 0 assumption is particular to the structure of our model and need not be incorporated in the econometric specification.
'We implicitly assume that K_; is not equivalent to K+ -i Under Keynesian uncertainty, it is realistic to assume that the adjustment to the previous period'3 desired capital stock is slow and under the Schumpeterian concept of competition, discontinous changes in investment strategies are possible. Thus it is consistent with the core assumptions of our analysis to assume that K -1 and that IN is based on K' .
/ "f, 11See Pugel (1978) and Goldstein (1986a) . Finally, given the high degree of multicollinearity in the sample data, it may be unrealistic to hope to distinguish from our estimation results the fine detail of the lag structure proposed by our theory.
13A constant term is included because the.aggregated equations that we test at best approximate firms. the sum of the equations for all 14See Chow and Lin (1971) However, industry output-augmenting investment will rise because greater competition means a lower average price and greater industry Qutput, ceteris paribus.
Our results must be distinguished from the neoclassical treatment of competition. TO the extent that our IPR reflects changes in foreign competition, the sign on the competition variable is both the sign of the firm and industry response to competition.-In neoclassical theory, both of these responses cannot be positive.
'33ee Clark (1979) and Kopcke (1985) . the profit rate and the defensive investment or Schumpeterian competition effect. Thus the total effect will be smaller than the direct (Schumpeterian) effect.
